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I. INTRODUCTION

The development of new technologies plays a significant role both
in the war against crime and in shaping Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.' While law enforcement technologies have advanced, so have the
* I would like to thank my best friend, Heather Boykin, for her constant love, support,
and understanding; John Lazarus, criminal defense attorney, and Professors Christopher Slobogin
and Kenneth Nunn of University of Florida College of Law for their valuable suggestions on this
Note; Doug McMakin for facilitating my understanding of imaging devices; and my grandfather,
Gustav Lazarus, for deciding to attend law school in 1929.
1. Cf. Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a FourthAmendment for the Twenty-First Century,

65 IND. L.J. 549, 557 n.41 (1990) (explaining that prior to 1880, during the "pre-technological
era," government lacked the tools which permitted close surveillance of its citizenry from a
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means that criminals use to combat them.2 Hence, developing new
methods of fighting crime has become increasingly important.
The latest weapon against crime can actually "see" right through
you.' Passive millimeter wave imagers, referred to as imaging devices,
can see items stored underneath clothing at a distance of ten feet or
more. 4 Imaging devices are designed to enable law enforcement officers

distance). Most police technology has been designed to enhance the senses, and in such cases,
the Court has almost uniformly found that these devices are constitutional. See, e.g., Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (upholding helicopter search of curtilage of home); Dow Chemical
v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (upholding search of industrial plant using airplane and
high powered aerial photography); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (upholding search
of backyard using airplane and aerial photography); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
(upholding use of beeper in container to track vehicle's movement); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979) (upholding use of pen register to record phone numbers dialed); United States
v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991) (upholding use of thermal imager used to
measure "waste heat" escaping from houses to detect indoor marijuana growth operations);
Stevenson v. State, 667 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (upholding police use of "bionic ears"
to monitor street conversation 75 feet away); Lafollette v. Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d 747,784
(Ky. 1996) (upholding use of "Forward Looking Infrared Radar" to observe heat omissions from
a suspect's residence).
2. See DAVID G. BOYD, STATEMENT BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 7-8 (May
17, 1995) (asserting that "our nation's police.., are still equipped much as Wyatt Earp was in
the late 19th Century"); U.S. Department of Justice, National Law Enforcement Technology
Center, National Institute of Justice, On Going Research & Development Projects [hereinafter
Technology] (on file with author). Some of the new technologies currently being funded by the
federal government and developed for law enforcement use are: imaging devices, illicit substance
detectors, night vision, infrared imaging devices, and less-than-lethal weapons such as stun guns,
pepper spray, disabling nets, and sticky foam. Id. Most of these devices raise no Fourth
Amendment issues and will not be discussed in this Note. For instance, less-than-lethal weapons
are primarily designed for detaining suspects under exigent circumstances. Some of the other
devices being developed, such as night vision, illicit substance detectors, and infrared imaging
devices, may raise some Fourth Amendment issues because they enhance an officer's ability to
discern criminal activity. However, this paper will focus on the Fourth Amendment issues that
will certainly be raised with the use of imaging devices.
3. Michael Fleeman, DETROIT NEwS, Aug. 14, 1996, at A16, availablein Westlaw, 1996
WL 2927550. In March 1995, the federal government funded the National Institute of Justice
(NIJ) with $2.15 million for research and development in concealed weapons detection. BOYD,
supra note 2, at 8-10. The NIJ initiated three major projects. Id. at 6. One of the projects,
produced by Millitech Corporation, will be capable of producing images of items underneath
clothing. See infra notes 4-15 and accompanying text. The other two projects, at Raytheon and
Idaho National Engineering Labaratory (INEL) produce no image. See infra note 75. This Note
focuses on Millitech's technology. See also David A. Harris, Superman s X-Ray Vision and the
Fourth Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1996)
(briefly reviewing the history on how the government became involved in funding weapons
detection technology).
4. Millimetrix, Presentation at Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
Systems for Law Enforcement Conference, in Boston, Mass. (Nov. 19-21, 1996) [hereinafter
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to identify plastic, ceramic, and metal objects, such as weapons and
explosives, concealed underneath clothing.5 Because of their design,
imaging devices also are able to detect contraband as well."
Imaging devices produce an image much like those produced by an
x-ray machine.7 Unlike x-ray machines, however, imaging devices are
harmless because they do not subject the body to harmful radiation!
When pointed at a subject, imaging devices produce a light gray outline
of the subject's body, and any objects stored on the person will appear
in black against the body.9

Millimetrix, Presentation]. Millimetrix was formed from a corporate buyout of the Contraband
Detection System Division of Millitech in June 1996. Thus, a reference to either Millitech or
Millimetrix refers to the same imaging device. Millitech's imaging device will be capable of
exposing outlines of shapes underneath clothing at remote distances and can be used to detect
contraband, metallic and non-metallic weapons, and explosives. Id. The media has overestimated
the range of Millitech's imaging device. See Fleeman, supra note 3, at A16 (reporting that "[a]
police officer can surreptitiously aim it into a crowd from as far away as 90 feet"). Remote
imaging is difficult because the image resolution degrades as the distance increases. Telephone
Interview with Doug McMakin, Engineer, Automation and Measurement Sciences, Pacific
Northwest Laboratory (Sept. 12, 1996).
5. MILLrrECH CORPORATION, THE MILLITECH IMAGING DEVICE (1994-96) (various
technical information on Millitech's Imaging device including a report given by Dr. G. Richard
Huguenin to Congress) (on file with author) (explaining "Millitech's recent development of
passive imaging technology for rapid and remote detection of metallic and non-metallic weapons,
plastic explosives, drugs, and other contraband concealed under multiple layers of clothing").
6. See id. The design of these devices also will enable them to see far more than just
illegal items. Id.
7. See id.
8. See id. (explaining that "passive millimeter wave imagers, unlike x-ray detectors, metal
detectors, or other active electromagnetic sensors, do not expose the subject to any man-made
electromagnetic fields or other radiation from the imaging system and do not pose any real or
perceived health risk to persons being observed, persons operating the imager, or to anyone in
the vicinity").
9. See id.; Doug McMakin, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Available Technology,
Detection System Reveals Weapons that Metal Detectors Miss, at I [hereinafter PNL] (on file
with author). Pacific Northwest Labaratory is developing a device for the Federal Aviation
Administration to be used in airports that uses the same passive millimeter technology as
Millitech Corporation. Id. However, PNL and Millitech utilize millimeter wave technology
differently. PNL's device is active. Id. at 2. That is, it emits millimeter waves that penetrate
clothing but bounce off the body and other objects. Id. These reflected waves are picked up by
a transceiver, digitized, and sent to a high-speed computer. Id. The computer then mathematically formulates a series of images that shows a person from various angles. Id An officer can then
distinguish the shapes of innocuous items on the body, such as watches and checkbooks, from
the shape of a gun. Id. In constrast, Millitech's device is passive. Telephone Interview with Dr.
Richard Huguenin, Millitech Corporation (Jan. 22, 1997). Its device views emissions generated
by the target and generates an image. Id.
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Imaging devices are currently being developed for portable and nonportable use.'" The non-portable model is designed for fixed entry-way
surveillance at facilities such as airports and government buildings."
The portable model is primarily for law enforcement use.' 2 The
portable model comes in two designs: car mounted and a smaller handheld version. 3 Both designs have the same purpose-to detect concealed weapons and contraband.' 4 Since imaging devices are not on the
street yet, police policies with respect to use of the devices remains
unsettled. 5 Indeed, police could use these devices in a fashion that
courts deem unconstitutional.
This Note discusses the two most likely places that police will use
imaging devices: on the street at targeted suspects 6 and at fixed
checkpoints on all passersby. 7 Part II of this Note reviews Fourth
Amendment search analysis and discusses whether the use of an imaging
device constitutes a search.
As with any type of surveillance technology, the central inquiry is
whether use of the devices constitutes a search under the Fourth

10. See MILLrrECH, supra note 5, at 5 (explaining that Millitech has under development
a large version for fixed entrance way surveillance and a smaller version that could be mounted
on a police car or hand-held by an officer). The larger version, the "gateway scanner," should
be commercially available by the end of 1997 at a cost of approximately $40,000. Telephone
interview with Dr. Richard Huguenin, Millitech Corporation (Jan. 22, 1997). The smaller
version, the "hand held scanner," should be available by mid-1998 at a cost of less than $10,000.
Id.
11. See MILLrrECH, supra note 5; see also PNL, supra note 9, at I (explaining that in
addition to airport use, the system could be used at mass transit systems such as subways and
trains; government buildings such as courtrooms, embassies, offices, and prisons; nuclear sites;
public gathering places such as concert and sporting arenas and religious shrines; and companies
concerned about theft prevention).
12. See BOYD, supra note 2, at 20 (explaining that "[t]his device is needed in three
configurations: one capable of being placed unobtrusively in school entrances; one capable of
being mounted in and operated from a vehicle; and a hand-held or portable version that can be
placed in high-interest locations").
13. BOYD, supra note 2, at 20.
14. MILLECH,supra note 5.
15. Millitech's "hand-held model will hit law enforcement in mid-1998 [and] the nonportable model is scheduled for December 1997"' Telephone interview with Dr. Richard
Huguenin, Millitech Corporation (Nov. 18, 1996). See PNL, supra note 9,at 2 (stating that a
prototype of PNL's fixed installation unit was tested with 150 volunteers at Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport in 1993); see also infra note 137; MILLIrECH, supranote 5 (stating that the
technology is the same for both the non-portable and portable models, but that the major
challenges are in reducing size, weight, power consumption, and cost, and in designing a more
rugged unit suitable for the needs of law enforcement).
16. MILLrrECH, supra note 5.
17. See BOYD, supra note 2, at 20 (explaining that "this device is needed in... highinterest locations").
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Amendment. 8 Without a search, there is no intrusion on an expectation
of privacy. 9 Without an expectation of privacy, there is no Fourth
Amendment violation2 0
For example, one type of police activity that is not considered a
search is a drug sniffing dog.2 The rationale is that drug dogs only
detect contraband, and a person cannot have an expectation of privacy
with respect to contraband.' Imaging devices are similar to drug dogs
in that they both expose otherwise invisible criminal evidence. However,
unlike drug dogs, imaging devices reveal both criminal and legitimate
private items.'
Part III discusses how police can use imaging devices on suspects on
the street. In essence, imaging devices enable officers to "frisk" suspects
for concealed weapons from a remote location.24 However, the Fourth
Amendment requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and
dangerous before an officer may conduct a lawful frisk.' Part III
reviews the case law relating to a lawful stop and frisk and ends with
a discussion of whether the reasonable suspicion standard for manual
frisks should apply to remote frisks using imaging devices.
Part IV discusses how police might use imaging devices at checkpoints. Checkpoint stops, because they do not require individualized
suspicion, are a popular police investigative technique. The Supreme
Court has approved checkpoints for drivers' licenses,26 illegal aliens2

18. 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.1, at 39 (2d ed. 1991).
19. See infra text accompanying note 39.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 64-65.
21. See infra text accompanying note 55.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 54-55.
23. The American Civil Liberties Union has objected to the use of this new technology,
saying that it "is an incredible invasion of privacy. It produces a virtual 3-D image, and you can
see the contours of breasts, buttocks and genitals." John S. Day, Breaking the Dress Code to
Combat Terrorism, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Aug. 15, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL
10704830. The National Association for Criminal Defense Lawyers also has objected, saying
"[t]he entire nation could become a victim of illegal searches and seizures and the law is
powerless to protect them from these police abuses." THE DETRorr NEWS, Aug. 14, 1996, at
A16, availablein Westlaw, 1996 WL 2927550. However, not everyone at the A.C.L.U. agrees.
Allan Parachini, spokesman for the A.C.L.U. of Southern California and an NIJ advisor
anticipates some privacy issues, but maintains that "[a]nyone who is sane is interested in trying
to find ways to have fewer guns on the streets.... The research should continue." David Van
Biema, Peekaboo: The New Detector,TIME, Mar. 27, 1995, at 29.
24. See MILLrrECH, supra note 5 (explaining that the camera will address the high priority
need for the police officer to conduct remote 'frisking' ").
25. See infra text accompanying notes 98-100.
26. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
27. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).
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and drunk drivers.28 In addition, a federal court recently approved a
checkpoint in which the state checked for drivers' licenses as a pretext
to expose motorists to drug sniffing dogs.29 In striking similarity to the
pretextual checkpoint, the Supreme Court recently ruled that an officer's
improper motive, or pretext, will not invalidate a lawful traffic stop."
Hence, there is a strong likelihood that the Court will uphold pretextual
checkpoints set up to search for criminal evidence. There is also a
possibility, albeit more remote, that the Court might approve checkpoints
designed solely for detecting criminal evidence. Approval of either of
these checkpoints would afford police the opportunity to use imaging
devices. After reviewing the unresolved case law on checkpoints, Part
IV analyzes such criminal checkpoints as a new context in which
imaging devices may be employed.
H-.KATz, DOGS, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. When Is Police Action a Search?
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."31 Traditionally, the Supreme Court required a "physical intrusion into 'a constitutionally protected area' "for a government technique to be classified as
a search under the Fourth Amendment.32 Before 1967, the Court strictly
interpreted the Fourth Amendment and limited protected areas to those

28.
29.
30.
31.
prohibits

Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1548 (11th Cir. 1995).
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment consists of two clauses; the first
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the second describes the requirements for a

valid warrant. See generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in
Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 487-532

(1995) (discussing the historical context behind the Fourth Amendment).
32. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, HORNBOOK SERIES

§ 3.2, at 124 (1992) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)).
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enumerated in the text itself." Then, in 1967, the Supreme Court
handed down the landmark decision of Katz v. United States."
In Katz, FBI agents overheard the defendant's telephone conversations by attaching an electronic listening device to the exterior of the
public telephone booth from which he was calling. The Katz Court
rejected the "protected area" approach and decided that the Fourth
Amendment protects legitimate expectations of privacy, wherever they
exist.3 6 The Court explained that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.... But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected."'37 The Katz Court reasoned that when one enters a phone
booth, closes the door behind him, and pays the toll, he is "entitled to
assume that [his] words.., will not be broadcast to the world."3
The Katz decision is extremely important because it introduced the
test for determining when a government activity constitutes a search.
The Katz Court held that government activity that infringes into an area
in which there is a "reasonable expectation of privacy" is a search.39
33. Id. at 124. For an example of a case considering a search of a "person," see Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood tests) (cited by LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 32, §
3.2, at 125 n.10). For examples of cases considering searches of "houses," see Clinton v.
Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (apartments); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel
rooms); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (garages); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932) (business offices); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (stores); See
v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (warehouses) (cited by LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note
32, § 3.2, at 125 nn.4-9). For an example of a case considering a search of "papers," see Ex
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 727 (1877) (letters) (cited by LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 32,
§ 3.2, at 125 n.10). For an example of a case considering a search of "effects," see Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (automobiles) (cited by LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 32,
§ 3.2. at 125 n.10).
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35. Id. at 348.
36. Id. at 351.
37. Id. at 351-52.
38. Id. at 352.
39. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (interpreting the majority's holding). Justice
Harlan, in concurrence, framed the rule in a two-pronged test. Id. at 361. First, a person must
have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy. Id. Second, that expectation must be one which
society deems reasonable. Id. In the three years after Katz, Justice Harlan and the Court retreated
from the two-pronged test primarily because they realized that subjective expectation may afford
no privacy at all. I JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.6, at 54 (2d ed. 1991).
Professor Amsterdam, in a widely cited law review article, explained that "each person's
subjective expectation [could be rendered meaningless if the government were to announce] halfhourly on television that 1984 was being advanced by a decade and that we were all forthwith
being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance." Id. at 54-55 (citing Anthony
Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the FourthAmendment, 58 MiNN. L. REV. 349, 384-85 (1974)). The
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The Katz Court found that the government's warrantless taping of the
phone booth invaded an area in which Katz had a reasonable expectation
of privacy. 4' Accordingly, the Court held that the taping constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment.4 '
Generally, a Fourth Amendment search must be accompanied by a
warrant issued upon probable cause42 "subject to a few.., well
delineated exceptions."'43 Before Katz, the list of exceptions to the
warrant requirement was extremely short;' since Katz, the Court has
recognized many more exceptions.' When the Court determines that
a government activity is not a search, the Fourth Amendment is not
invoked, and there is no further inquiry.' Under Katz, a court may find

Supreme Court subsequently agreed with Amsterdam that the first part of the Katz test adds
nothing to the analysis where expectations are conditional). Id. § 2.6, at 55 n.8 (citing Smith v.
Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979)); see also William Shepard McAninch, Unreasonable
Expectations: The Supreme Court and the Fourth Amendment, 20 STETSON L. REV. 435 (1991)
(criticizing the Katz two-part test). The present Supreme Court follows a balancing approach.
HALL, supra, § 2.7, at 60. "[The Supreme Court's] cases show that in determining reasonableness, [the Court has] balanced the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Id. § 2.7. at 60 n.39 (quoting
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1990)).
40. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
41. Id. at 353.
42. See Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1258 (1983) (defining probable cause as "an appropriate
balance between the government's need to obtain evidence and the innocent person's right to
be free from an intrusive search"); see also Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth
Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 39 (1991). "In the arrest context, it exists when the facts and
circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the
person to be seized has committed or is committing a crime. In the search context, probable
cause refers to a belief by the same prudent person that the evidence or persons to be seized are
located at the place to be searched." Id.(footnotes omitted). While the textbook probable cause
standard is a 51% percent level of certainty, it actually might be less in practice. Id.
43. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993).
44. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (allowing an exception for hot
pursuit of fleeing felon); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (granting an exception
for a warrantless search of automobile based on probable cause that the car contained
contraband).
45. See e.g. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (administrative and regulatory
searches); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (automobile inventory searches); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (special needs in public schools); Illinois v; Lafayette, 462
U.S. 640 (1983) (inventory search of arrested persons); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976) (border searches); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, (1973) (consent
searches); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (pervasively regulated industry in sale
of firearms); Chambers v. Maroney, 309 U.S. 227 (1970) (automobile probable cause searches);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (plain view).
46. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989).
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there is no search where a person's expectation of privacy is not
protected because that expectation is unreasonable.47
B. When Is Police Action Not a Search?
One important case in which the Supreme Court found that an
activity was not a search is United States v. Place.4" Place was stopped
in an airport after officers received a tip that he might be carrying
drugs.49 A drug sniffing dog alerted" officers to the presence of drugs

47. The following cases are examples of post-Katz reasonable expectation of privacy cases:
United States v. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. 1936 (1993) (no expectation of privacy while driving
another's car); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (no expectation of privacy in helicopter
search of curtilage of home); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (no expectation of
privacy in garbage left at curbside); Dow Chem. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (no
expectation of privacy in search of industrial plant using airplane and high powered aerial
photography); Califoma v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (no expectation of privacy in search
of backyard using airplane and aerial photography); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (no
expectation of privacy in use of pen register to record phone numbers dialed); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no expectation of privacy in bank records); United States v.
Dionosio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (no expectation of privacy in voice exemplars); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (no expectation of privacy in inspection of pawnshop's records
and guns); Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (no expectation of
privacy in inspection of liquor store bottles); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220
(D. Haw. 1991) (stating there is no expectation of privacy in "waste heae' escaping from one's
home and intercepted by police using a thermal imager to detect active marijuana grows);
Stevenson v. State, 667 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (stating there is no expectation of
privacy in street conversation monitored by police from 75 feet away using "bionic ears").
48. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
49. Id. at 698-99.
50. One recent appellate court gave an officer's description of an "alert" as follows: "It
usually starts off with an intensive sniffing of the area, followed usually by what we call a tail
flag, [sic] the tail will rise and hair at the base of the tail usually comes up a little bit. That's
usually followed by an aggressive pouring or scratching at the article, the area which she's
alerting on, and can be followed by a biting sequence if I allow it to go that far." State v.
Boyce, 723 P.2d 28, 29 n.2 (Wash. CL App. 1986). The Place Court found that an alert by a
narcotics trained dog establishes the requisite probable cause to conduct a more thorough search.
See Place, 462 U.S. at 706.
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in Place's bags.5 After a full search of Place's bags, officers discovered cocaine.
The Place Court focused on the nature of the investigative technique
used.52 The Court found that a canine sniff does not amount to a search
because a canine sniff does not require opening luggage or rummaging
through its contents and is only capable of detecting the presence of
narcotics.53 The Court found that canine sniffs are a minimally intrusive device for executing the strong government interest in reducing the
flow of illegal drugs. 4 The Court stated that it was not aware of an
investigative procedure that is so limited in its approach and in the
content of the information revealed. 5

51. Place,462 U.S. at 699. One state court recently noted that "[h]umans have relied on
the dog's keen sense of smell for literally thousands of years." State v. Juarez-Godinez, 900 P.2d
1044, 1056 (Ct. App. Ore. 1995). The court observed that in 700 B.C., in the ancient Greek Epic
by Homer, the Odyssey, Odysseus returned to his home and family disguised as a beggar, and
no one recognized him except his devoted tracking hound, Argos. Id. at 1056. As far back as
1570, in England and in this country, dogs were used to track thieves. Id. In 1755, Benjamin
Franklin proposed using dogs to search surrounding woods as a defensive measure against Indian
raids. Id. at 1057. Harriet Beacher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852) described how dogs were
used to track runaway slaves. Id. The court maintained that "[i]nasmuch as dogs have been used
for [aiding man's senses] since long before the advent of either the state or federal constitutions,
there is an historical exception for such use of dogs, i.e., such a use would not be a search."
Juarez-Godinez, 900 P.2d at 1057 n.4; see also Buck v. State, 138 P.2d 115, 116 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1943) (" 'It is a matter of common knowledge, and therefore a matter of which courts will
take notice, that the breed of dogs known as bloodhounds is possessed of a high degree of
intelligence, and acuteness of scent, and may be trained to follow human tracks with
considerable certainty and success if put upon a recent trail' ") (quoting State v. Thomas Hall,
4 Ohio Dec. 147).
52. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 705-07.
55. Id. at 707. The Court stated that the "the canine sniff is sui generis." Id. Justice
Blackmun, in concurrence, thought that "a dog sniff may be a search, but a minimally intrusive
one that could be justified in this situation under Terry upon reasonable suspicion." Id. at 723
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Since Katz, most state courts likewise have held that a dog sniff is
not a search. See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 E2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982)
(canine sniff of school students' lockers and automobiles not a search); People v. Salih, 173 Cal.
App. 3d 1009 (1985) (canine sniff of United Parcel Service package not a search); Joseph v.
State, 588 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (canine sniff during traffic stop not a search); State
v. Morrison, 500 N.W.2d 547 (Neb. 1993) (canine sniff of luggage not a search); but see
McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (dog sniff of warehouse exterior to
public was search requiring reasonable suspicion); People v. Boylan, 854 P.2d 807 (Colo. 1993)
(dog sniff of package at Federal Express office was search requiring reasonable suspicion); State
v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710 (1990) (dog sniff of car's exterior was search requiring reasonable
suspicion).
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In United States v. Jacobsen,5 6 a case decided one year after Place,
the Supreme Court dealt with a device similar to canine sniffs. In
Jacobsen, Federal Express employees, following company policy,
opened a package because the package was damaged during shipment.5 7
Upon opening the package, Federal Express found a number of bags
containing white powder.5 Federal Express notified the DEA and
resealed the package. 9 The DEA opened the package and conducted
a drug field test on its contents, revealing that the substance was
cocaine.'
The Jacobsen Court found that, like the canine sniff in Place, the
field test was not a search since it was only capable of discovering
whether the package contained drugs.6 The Court held that government
activity that revealed solely whether an item contains drugs and revealed
no other private fact violates no legitimate expectation of privacy.62
Hence, the rule extracted from Place and Jacobsen is that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband.63
C. Is Police Use of an Imaging Device a Search?
Does the Katz and Jacobsen rule that there is no expectation of
privacy in contraband apply to imaging devices? If the use of an
imaging device is a search, then Fourth Amendment requirements would
have to be met.' If using imaging devices is not a search, then police
could use such devices without constitutional constraints.65 In addition,
the exclusionary rule would not prevent admission of evidence obtained
by the use of the devices in criminal trials. 6

56. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
57. Id. at 111.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 111-12.
61. See id. at 122-23.
62. Id. at 123. "[G]overnmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine,
and no other arguably 'private' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest." Id.
63. One commentator has suggested that the Place rule-that the use of a drug sniffing
dog to discover contraband does not involve a search-is consistent with 100 year-old existing
jurisprudence in which the Supreme Court suggested that there could be no Fourth Amendment
objection against governmental searches and seizures of stolen property. Richard G. Wilkins,
Defining the "ReasonableExpectation of Privacy":An Emerging TripartiteAnalysis, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 1077, 1124-25 (1987) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624 (1886)). But cf
Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987) (holding that a Fourth Amendment search occurred
where an officer moved stolen stereo equipment to determine its serial numbers).
64. See HALL, supra note 18, § 2.1, at 39.
65. See id.
66. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638 (holding that invoices obtained in violation of the Fourth

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

11

Florida
LawLAW
Review,
FLORIDA
REVIEWVol. 48, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 3

[Vol. 48

Imaging devices can see the outlines of objects concealed underneath
one's clothing.67 The Katz rule is that intrusions into areas in which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy are searches.18 The
question, then, is whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the objects one stores underneath clothing or inside personal
belongings. The answer is almost certainly yes. The Katz Court stated
that those items a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."69 In Katz,
even though the defendant was making a telephone call in public, he
expected that by entering the booth and closing the door, his call could
not be heard by anyone else.7" The Katz Court held that his expectation
was reasonable.' Similarly, in walking down a city street, a person has
a legitimate expectation of privacy in those items that he keeps out of
the viewing range of the public through storage in his pockets or
underneath his clothing.72
The purpose behind imaging devices, the detection of illegal activity,
does not make an expectation of privacy any less legitimate. The Place
rule, as interpreted above, is that devices that detect only illegal activity
do not intrude upon any legitimate privacy interest. 3 If imaging
devices could detect only the presence of illegal items, then there
probably would not be a Fourth Amendment objection to the use of such
devices.74 Hence, contraband-specific devices currently being developed
for law
enforcement use should not be barred by the Fourth Amend75
ment.
Amendment were not admissible as evidence). The exclusionary rule, in its simplest form, states
that evidence obtained in an illegal search is inadmissible at trial. Cf. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra
note 32, § 3.1, at 105-07. Criticizing the exclusionary rule, Justice Cardozo once quipped that
"the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." See generally id. at 105-24
(discussing the origins, purposes, and critics of the exclusionary rule).
67. See supra note 2.
68. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 351-52.
70. Id. at 352.
71. Id.
72. See supra text accompanying note 37.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
74. See-Loewy, supra note 42, at 1246 (stating that "ifa device could be invented that
accurately detected weapons and did not disrupt the normal movement of people, there could
be no fourth amendment objection to its use"); Letter from Christopher Slobogin, Professor,
University of Florida College of Law, to David A. Harris, Professor, University of Toledo
College of Law (Sept. 5, 1995) (stating that, "IF a device were developed that registered ONLY
contraband, IF it were used surreptitiously and IF it hurts no one, should we care whether it is
beamed into everyone's house? I think the answer might well be no."), quoted in Harris, supra
note 3, at 43 n.240.
75. Raytheon and INEL, the two companies mentioned in note 3, are developing
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Imaging devices may be compared with drug-sniffing dogs. The
dog's extraordinary sense of smell is used as a substitute for the
officer's senses. This substitute allows officers to discover illegal
narcotics that otherwise would be completely unexposed. Likewise,
imaging devices enable officers to see weapons and drugs that otherwise
would be impossible to detect. Thus, both dogs and imaging devices
yield the same end result; they reveal what would otherwise be
impossible to detect through normal human senses.
While drug dogs and imaging devices yield the same outcome, the
use of dogs is less intrusive. As the Place Court noted, drug dogs
produce limited information, the presence or absence of drugs, by the
use of a limited means, the canine nose.7 6 The Place Court found that
drug dogs are incapable of exposing non-contraband." Conversely,
imaging devices are not limited in the information they reveal or the
means in which they function. Imaging devices will expose objects
stored inside pockets, underneath clothing, and inside bags and
purses.78 Imaging devices might be capable of viewing extremely
personal items such as a prosthetic limb, a woman's sanitary napkin, a
colostomy bag, or more unusual items.79 Hence, the design of imaging
devices will enable them to see not only illegal items, but also private
items as well. For these reasons, imaging devices are not materially
analogous to the techniques employed in Place or Jacobsen,techniques
that involved devices that only detected the presence of contraband.8"
Thus, the use of imaging devices should be classified as a search under
the Fourth Amendment.

contraband-specific devices designed to detect. metal objects. Harris, supra note 3, at 7 n.38.
Raytheon's device produces no image. Id. It is essentially a modified metal detector that detects
metal objects fitting the "signature" of a gun. Id. INEL's device is more limited than Raytheon's
in that it is not capable of remote detection, but is more for fixed entry-way surveillance. Il at
9 n.41. The INEL device can be used covertly because it can be built into walls of a building.
Id. Westinghouse Electric Corporation is developing an illicit substance detector (ISD). U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (May 15, 1995) (on file with author).
The ISD is a hand-held electronic device that detects trace amounts of cocaine and heroin. Id.
Used "on the scene," the ISD produces laboratory results in less than one minute by analyzing
surface swabs. Id.
76. See Place,462 U.S. at 707; see supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
77. See Place,462 U.S. at 707; see supra text accompanying note 53.
78. See supra note 4.
79. Stephen Ewart, Cross-Dressers Flock to Kananaskis, CALGARY HERALD, Nov. 15,
1995, at A2, available in Westlaw, 1995 WL 7325177 (reporting a cross-dressing convention
in Calgary for heterosexual men who wear "lacy panties and bras" and that many cross-dressers
will not attend the convention for "fear [of] being exposed and how it could affect their job,
their standing in the community and even their family r6lationship").
80. See Jacobson, 466 U.S. at 122; Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
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III. IMAGING DEVICES AND STOP AND FRISKS

A. The Seminal Case: Terry v. Ohio
Assuming that the use of an imaging device is a search, the Fourth
Amendment's requirements apply to its use." As mentioned previously,
a Fourth Amendment search must be accompanied by a warrant unless
one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement apply.8 2 Most exceptions to the warrant requirement require probable cause,83 although
some require a lower level of suspicion.84 The requirement of some
level of individualized suspicion limits the government's discretionary
authority to search for evidence of crime." These lower levels of
suspicion cannot be found in the text of the Constitution;86 rather, the
Supreme Court has created them out of necessity.8
Before Terry v. Ohio,88 the Supreme Court required probable cause
for any seizure of a person. 9 The issue in Terry was whether an officer
needed probable cause, the standard required to make an arrest, or some
lesser standard to stop and frisk a suspect.' The Terry Court recognized-that a stop and frisk was less intrusive than a full blown search.
The Court found that a stop and frisk was still a significant intrusion
which implicates the Fourth Amendment.9 The Terry Court asserted
that a stop and frisk, "performed in public by a policeman while the
citizen stands helpless" is not a "petty indignity."92 Instead, "[ilt is a

81. See supra text accompanying note 64.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
83. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 395 (1985) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment requires that police have probable cause to search a stationary mobile home which
falls within the automobile exception).
84. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1984) (upholding search of school
student's purse on reasonable suspicion); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (upholding
stop and frisk on reasonable suspicion of danger).
85. See Olmstead v. United States, 274 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Fourth Amendment rests on "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive
of rights").
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
87. See Lawrence J. Wadsack, Note, The Plain Touch Doctrine and Confusion Following

United States v. Dickerson: The Terry Frisk Needs an Expansion, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1053,
1086 & nn.202-05 (1995) (discussing a series of cases in which the Court permitted warrantless
searches by applying the Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Clause and balanced the public
interest in solving a societal problem against invasions on individual privacy).
88. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
89. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1979).
90. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
91. Id. at 16-17.
92. Id. at 17.
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serious intrusion... which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong
resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly."93
Having rejected the probable cause standard with respect to a stop
and frisk, the Terry Court sought a standard to accommodate the
competing governmental and privacy interests.94 The Terry Court lifted
a balancing test from Camara v. Municipal Court,9" a case decided a
year earlier, which" 'balanc[ed] the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails.' "96 The Terry Court recognized the extreme
need to protect officers making a lawful stop from assaults launched by
suspects with a concealed weapon.97 Accordingly, the Court found that
the government's need to frisk reasonably dangerous suspects was
substantial and outweighed the suspect's interest in remaining free from
restraint.9 8 The Court ruled that a "brief' stop could be made upon
reasonable suspicion of evidence of crime.9 9 In addition, the Court
ruled that once a suspect is stopped, the officer may conduct a frisk only
if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the suspect is engaged in a
crime of violence or is armed and dangerous."°
B. Is Police Use of Imaging Devices a Frisk?
Terry allows police to stop an individual upon reasonable suspicion
that crime is afoot. 1 ' If the suspected crime is a violent one, or if the
officer reasonably suspects that the suspect is dangerous, the officer may
pat down the suspect's outer clothing for weapons that might be used
to harm the officer or others. °2 Imaging devices fit nicely into the

93. Id.
94. Id. at 24, 27.

95. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
96. Id. at 21 (quoting Camara,387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)).
97. Id. at 23. The Terry Court noted that "every year in this country many law
enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded." Id.
98. Id. at 26-27.
99. Id. at 27.
100. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Slobogin, supra note 42, at 40.
101. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
102. See id. A frisk is a brief pat-down of the clothing for weapons; a search incident to
arrest is much more intrusive. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 32, § 3.8, at 212-13. In illustrating
the intrusiveness of a search incident to arrest, the Terry Court offered the following description:
"Mhe officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the [suspect's] body. A thorough
search must be made of the [suspect's] arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and the
area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet." Terry, 392 U.S. at 17
n.13 (quoting Piar & Martin, Searchingand DisarmingCriminals,45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 481
(1954)). Thus, an officer is only permitted to conduct such an invasive search on a suspect who
has been arrested and who is being brought into custody since the arrestee may have an
opportunity to access a cleverly concealed weapon. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 32, § 3.8, at
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Terry framework. Thus, if there is reasonable suspicion of danger, such
that an officer may perform a manual frisk, 3 Terry should permit an
use an imaging device to find out whether a suspect is
officer 1 to
4
armed. 0
Imaging devices are a viable alternative to manual frisks. The
Supreme Court has stressed that Terry frisks serve one purpose: to
ensure the safety of police officers. 5 Imaging devices are entirely
consistent with this principle and are in fact safer for police than Terry
stops. In a Terry stop an officer manually frisks a suspect, subjecting the
officer to dangers such as drug needles and attacks." 6 Imaging devices, on the other hand, provide an officer with the ability to conduct a
"remote" frisk." These devices can be used at distances of ten feet or
more and hence obviate the need to manually frisk a suspect.'0° By
producing an image of objects one has stored on his person, the officer
can see whether threats exist and can take the necessary precautions
when apprehending the suspect."
The Terry frisk permits an officer to pat down the outer clothing for
weapons that could be readily grasped by the suspect to "harm the
officer or others nearby.."" If during this pat-down the officer feels
what he reasonably believes is drugs or some other contraband, he is
entitled to remove it."' In Minnesota v. Dickerson,"' the Supreme
Court reiterated that a Terry frisk is a pat-down for weapons for the
officer's safety; Terry does not permit an officer to manipulate an object
inside a suspect's clothing in an effort to better determine the object's
213 & n.51.
103. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
104. Imaging devices are designed for this purpose. See MILLITECH, supra note 5 (stating
that, "A priority application of passive millimeter wave imaging is the remote search for
concealed weapons. The ability to conduct remote 'frisking' is advantageous ... to examine a
suspicious person or persons for the presence of concealed weapons.").
105. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
106. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 104.
108. MILLITECH, supra note 5 (explaining that, "Screening can be done remotely and with
as much discretion as the situation requires.... The ability to conduct remote 'frisking' is
advantageous [for] a patrolman who does not wish to heighten tensions by having direct physical
contact with a suspect and/or does not wish to be exposed to the threat of being punctured by
an exposed contaminated hypodermic needle during a manual patdown."); PNL, supra note 9,

at 4.
109. See MILLITECH, supra note 5 (explaining that Millitech's device can be used by "a
patrolman in a police car who may want to examine a suspicious person or persons for the
presence of concealed weapons before vehicle egress"); see also supra note 104.
110. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.
111. Id. at 29-30.
112. 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
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identity."' The Dickerson Court ruled that in order for an officer to
remove evidence, it must be "immediately apparent" to him that it is
illegal." 4
Imaging devices do not expand a manual frisk because (or since)
they do not expose contraband that officers would not have discovered
otherwise during a manual frisk. Because they produce only outlines of
items underneath clothing without disclosing the contents of those items,
imaging devices do not expand the "immediately apparent" rule set out
in Dickerson."5 For example, if an officer spots a vial in a person's
pocket using an imaging device, the officer would not know whether its
contents are legal or illegal. "6
However, in the future, imaging devices may enable an officer to
determine with immediate apparency the contents of any item stored
underneath clothing. However, this should not affect the constitutionality
of an imaging device's use so long as the officer has reasonable
suspicion of danger before he or she conducts a remote frisk. Even if
imaging devices are more intrusive than conventional frisk methods, the
officer's need to remotely frisk dangerous suspects should outweigh the
suspect's interest in remaining free from the resulting intrusion."'
After all, the purpose of the Terry frisk is to protect officers,18 and
remote frisks using imaging devices better protect officer safety." 9
There are compelling arguments that remote frisks using imaging
devices are actually less intrusive than manual frisks. In finding that a
113. Id. at 378. The Dickerson Court found that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
were violated where crack cocaine was discovered only after the frisking officer squeezed and
manipulated a small lump in the suspect's pocket. Id. See generally Wadsack, supra note 87,
for an excellent discussion of the Dickerson case).
114. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375. This is known as the "plain touch" doctrine. LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 32, § 3.2, at 5 (Supp. 1996). There is also a "plain smell" doctrine. See
United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 486 (1985) (upholding search after officer smelled
marijuana). Police use of drug-sniffing dogs as a type of plain smell has been criticized by
scholars. See I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.2(0, at 451 ("As one commentator has rightly noted, 'application of a "plain
smell" doctrine... stretches the imagination.' ") (quoting Comment, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
410, 423 (1976)). Courts also have recognized a "plain hear" doctrine. See United States v.
Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1052 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that there is no expectation of privacy
in hotel room conversations audible to the naked ear); Stevenson v. State, 667 So. 2d 410, 413
(Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (holding that there is no expectation of privacy when officer uses "bionic
ears" to monitor conversations taking place 75-feet away).
115. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375.
116. See MILLITECH, supra note 5 (explaining that weapons or contraband concealed deeply
in body cavities will not be detectable).
117. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26-27; see also supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
118. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
119. See supra note 108.
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manual frisk was "a limited search" but no small or petty indignity, the
Terry Court stated that a frisk "constitutes a severe, though brief,
intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an
annoying, frightening and perhaps humiliating experience.""'n Since
they provide the officer with a remote frisk, imaging devices obviate the
need for physical contact with the suspect.' Moreover, the suspect
need not be relegated to a subservient position to accommodate a remote
frisk with an imaging device." In fact, since imaging devices are
designed to work at distances of ten feet or more, the suspect may be
unaware that he or she is being scanned for weapons." This is
especially true if an officer employs a device mounted on a patrol
car. 24 With the requisite suspicion, an officer may simply drive by the
suspect and scan for weapons." Finally, frisks detain suspects longer
than imaging devices. While a legal frisk may take as long as twenty
minutes," an imaging device can accomplish the same task in just a
few seconds.'27
Since imaging devices are no more intrusive than Terry frisks, courts
should authorize their use subject to the same limitation applicable to
manual frisks-reasonable suspicion of danger. This standard will enable
police to quickly and safely locate weapons when there is a reasonable
120. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25.
121. See supra notes 104, 108.
122. See supra notes 104, 108.
123. See MILLITECH, supra note 5 (explaining that imaging devices are useful if the officer
is in a patrol car and wants to examine a person for the presence of concealed weapons). A
suspect also would be unaware if the police are outside the building that the suspect is
occupying. Id. "[S]ince millimeter wave radiation can penetrate many common building
materials, the camera could be used to observe the location and activities of potential suspects
within a room from outside the room, thereby providing valuable information to law enforcement
officers prior to entering the room." Id. In fact, Millitech is developing a two-man portable
device that can be set up in a few minutes, a "through-the-wall imaging system," to enable
surveillance of a room from a location outside the room. Id. Applications of this device include
observation of drug activity, hostage situations, or other scenarios where armed criminals may
be inside a closed area. Millimetrix, Presentation, supra note 4.
124. See supra note 109; supra text accompanying note 13.
125. See supra note 109.
126. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 688 (1985) (upholding a 20-minute stop
and frisk).
127. See PNL, supra note 9, at 3 (stating that the system can currently screen subjects in
one to two minutes and that the desired speed is five to six seconds). Millitech reported that the
time to screen a person with the non-portable model is "estimated to be about 30 seconds, with
10 seconds to generate each of two images (front/back) and another 10 seconds for the screenee
to enter the booth, turn around between scans, for the operator to make a 'pass/fail' decision,
and for the screenee to exit." Millimetrix, Presentation, supra note 4. The hand-held model can
scan a suspect in a few seconds, and the image is displayed on an LCD monitor on the backside
of the scanner. Id.
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suspicion of danger while protecting persons from indiscriminate use of
imaging devices by police.
IV.

CHECKPOINTS AND IMAGING DEVICES

A. Background and Supreme Court Checkpoints
A stop and frisk involves a street encounter in which an officer must
have individualized suspicion to stop a suspect. The requirement of
individualized suspicion limits an officer's discretion to search persons
for evidence of crime. This part discusses a different scenario--checkpoint stops by police. A checkpoint typically involves stopping
all persons at a fixed location for a brief investigation.'28 Courts have
allowed police to conduct checkpoints without individualized suspicion
because the operation of a checkpoint does not require the exercise of
discretion; the police stop everyone passing through." 9
Airport security systems provide one example of a checkpoint that
many persons experience each year."' In order to board a commercial
flight, all passengers are required to undergo a metal detector search of
their person and an X-ray scan of their carry-on luggage. 3 ' Imaging
devices are being developed for airports because the metal detectors and
x-ray machines currently in place are no longer adequate. Metal
detectors are inadequate since, as their name suggests, they detect only
metal.'33 Thus, metal detectors pose no barrier to anyone carrying a
plastic gun or explosive onto a plane."M X-ray machines also are

128. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656 (1979).
129. See id. at 663.
130. See David Gergen, The New Fear of Flying, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 29,
1996, at 64 (reporting that 547 million passengers board commercial aircraft in the United States
each year).
131. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 1973) (noting that in 1972,
the FAA "requir[ed] air carriers to adopt and put into use.., a screening system 'acceptable'
to the FAA 'to prevent or deter the carriage aboard its aircraft of sabotage devices or weapons
in carry-on baggage or on or about the ...passengers' ") (quoting 37 Fed. Reg. 2500-01 (Feb.
2, 1972)).
132. See Tom Belden, How Much Will You Pay for Safer Air Travel, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Aug. 19, 1996, at 14 (commenting that "[d]espite the concern about foreign
terrorism... security screening in U.S. airports continues to depend on 1960's-era technology
designed primarily to stop would-be hijackers carrying guns").
133. As one legal scholar has pointed out, metal detectors are a poor security device since
they cannot even distinguish pocket change or keys from a gun or a knife. Loewy, supra note
42, at 1246.
134. See Elizabeth Gleick, No Barrierto Mayhem: U.S. Airport Security Is Lax Compared
with Other Countries. The FAA Is in No Hurry to Improve It, TIME, July 29, 1996, at 42
(reporting that the "[t]he modem-era of air terrorism... began on December 21, 1988, when
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limited because they cannot scan persons without subjecting the body
to harmful radiological rays.' Consequently, imaging devices are an
excellent replacement for these traditional devices.'36 Given the urgent
need for better security, airports probably will be the first to employ
imaging devices.'37 Given that the use of metal detectors and X-ray

Pan Am Flight 103 was blasted out of the sky.., by 14 ounces of plastic explosives packed
into a radio cassette recorder in a piece of luggage").
135. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
136. See Van Biema, supra note 23, at 29 (noting that "[sluch a gadget would obviously
improve on the current 'is-it-an-Uzi-or-is-it-car-keys' standard of airport metal detectors"); PNL,
supra note 9, at 2 (depicting a photo of a millimiter wave imager penetrating subject's clothing
to reveal a Glock- 17 gun made of plastic and metal). Another advantage of imaging devices over
traditional devices is that "[a] digital record of each image of each screenee can be stored for
future reference." Millimetrix, Presentation, supra note 4, at 3.
137. Since Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed by a terrorist act, see Gleick, supra note 134,
the FAA has spent $120 million on dozens of programs aimed at upgrading security measures
in airports. Otis Port, Science & Technology: Security, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 5, 1996, at 78. The
cost to airlines has been estimated at $400 million to $2.2 billion to install explosive detectors
in the 75 busiest airports. Gergen, supra note 130, at 64. Airports in foreign countries are
already using upgraded technology in the baggage area to scan luggage for weapons and
explosives. Port, supra, at 78. The European Civil Aviation Conference recently mandated that
all checked baggage must be electronically screened by the year 2000. Id. The InVision CTX
5000, at $1 million a piece, was certified by the Federal Aviation Administration in 1994, and
is now on the commercial market Id. InVision employs x-ray technology to generate a 3D image
of the contents of luggage by viewing it from different angles. While the company has delivered
11 units in Europe, one in Japan, and three in Israel, as of the time this Note was written, only
three are in place in the United States-Delta Airlines in Atlanta, United Airlines in San
Francisco, and Israel's El Al Airlines in JFK. Id. There is also a sense of urgency in courthouses. See Jack Wax, Courtroom Violence: What Can We Do About It, USA TODAY MAG., May
1, 1994, at 26-27 ("The U.S. Marshals Service tracks all threats against Federal judges and, in
1991, recorded 362 validated threats against them. The seriousness of these is underscored by
the number of weapons the marshals confiscated at courthouse security checkpoints-more than
8,000 in 1991. That figure doesn't include the 220,000 concealed weapons law enforcement
officials forgot to check in at the front door."). The same argument can be made for courthouses,
since like airports, courthouses employ metal detectors and x-ray machines. See Downing v.
Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972) (upholding a brief stop and cursory inspection of
briefcases and packages for weapons prior to entering a federal building). An argument also
could be made for public schools even though no school has yet to employ an x-ray machine.
See People v. Dukes, 580 N.Y.S. 2d 850, 853-54 (Crim. Ct. of N.Y. 1992) (approving metal
detector searches at public schools). Justice Allen stated:
It is unfortunate that we have reached the point where so many of our great public
institutions resemble medieval fortresses. Every day long lines of people wait at the
magnetometers in our courthouse, sometimes forming a human moat which snakes
around the side of the building. This sight is a sobering reminder of the price we
pay for security. But to envision students and teachers (or court personnel, litigants,
and their families) huddled in fear as they attempt to go about their daily work is
a far worse image.
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machines in airports is legal because of the extreme safety concerns,138
it is unlikely that there will be a Fourth
Amendment objection to the use
39
setting.'
this
in
devices
imaging
of
However, another type of checkpoint in which law enforcement
officials may use imaging devices, suspicionless stops of motorists by
police, does raise Fourth Amendment concerns." The United States
Supreme Court has approved checkpoints for drivers' licenses and
registrations,"' illegal aliens,"' and drunk drivers. 43 Because they
look for evidence of crime, imaging devices do not fit within the
checkpoints the Court has legalized. However, recent case law suggests
a trend towards allowing checkpoints for detection of criminal evidence,
in which imaging devices would be useful.'"
Terry v. Ohio established that a seizure is reasonable only if the
police have particularized suspicion that the seized individual is involved
in criminal activity. 4 Temporary detentions of vehicles and their
drivers by police also constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.'" As such, a vehicle stop is subject to the Fourth Amendment
requirement that "it not be unreasonable under the circumstances."147
As a general rule, the decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable where the
police have probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred.'"
Like traffic stops, checkpoint stops are seizures under the Fourth
Amendment.' However, checkpoint stops are an exception to the
general rule that a seizure is reasonable only upon particularized
suspicion of criminal activity." ° Checkpoints are suspicionless stops
Id.
138. Davis, 482 F.2d at 900 (holding that a preboarding search of all passengers and their
carry-on luggage to detect the presence of weapons and explosives is reasonably necessary under
the Fourth Amendment to prevent airline terrorism).
139. See id.
140. See supra notes 16-18.
141. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
142. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).
143. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
144. See, e.g., Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1551 (11th Cir. 1995) (discussed infra notes
189-211 and accompanying text).
145. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
146. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996).
147. Id. at 1772.
148. Id. (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659; Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)
(per curium).
149. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 556 (recognizing that "[i]t is agreed that checkpoint stops
are 'seizures' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"); see also Brower v. County of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (ruling that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs "when there is
a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied').
150. See supra text accompanying notes 140-44.
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of all approaching motorists at a fixed roadblock for a brief investigation."' Unlike traffic stops, which are reasonable upon probable
cause, 52 checkpoint stops require no individualized suspicion whatsoever.153
In Delaware v. Prouse,"4 the Supreme Court distinguished a single
vehicle stop from a checkpoint stop of all vehicles. In Prouse, the court
disapproved as unreasonable a random stop of a vehicle and its driver
to check for a driver's license and car registration. 5 While the Prouse
Court recognized a lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle, 56 it
stated that it was still an expectation which should be recognized."
In reaching its holding, the Prouse Court relied on United States v.
5 8 a case decided three years earlier, in which the
Martinez-Fuerte,
Court upheld permanent, visible checkpoint stops near the border to look
for illegal aliens.'59 The Prouse Court noted that random stops infuse
police with "unbridled discretion."''" Conversely, permanent check-

151. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 656.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
153. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (stating that questioning at a roadblock-type stops might
pass constitutional muster).
154. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
155. Id. at 663. The Prouse Court recognized that states have "a vital interest in ensuring
that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are
fit for safe operation, and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements
are being observed." Id. at 658.
156. Id. at 662. The main reason that there is a reduced expectation of privacy is that
automobiles are very mobile and can be easily moved while officers are trying to secure a
warrant. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (holding that officers may
conduct searches of automobiles upon probable cause that the vehicle contains evidence of
crime, coupled with exigent circumstances to believe that the vehicle could be moved prior to
obtaining a warrant). A second reason for the reduced privacy expectation in automobiles is that
transportation is highly regulated. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)
("Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation
and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday
occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have
expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if
headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order."). Yet another reason for
the lesser privacy expectation in a vehicle rests in the plain view doctrine. See Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) ("A car has little capacity to escape public scrutiny. It travels
public thoroughfares where ... its occupants and its contents are in plain view.").
157. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662-63. "Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental
intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment
would be seriously circumscribed." Id.
158. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
159. Id. at 566-67. These stops lasted three to five minutes. Id. at 544-48.
160. Id. at 661. The Prouse court contrasted "discretionary spot checks" with the roving,
random patrols that looked for illegal aliens and smuggling activity in United States v. Brignoni-
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points are far less intrusive' 6 since "the motorist can see that other
vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers'
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the
intrusion."' 62
In dicta, the Prouse Court indicated that methods could be developed
to conduct stops of vehicles that "involve less intrusion or that do not
involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion" practiced in random
stops.'63 The Court suggested that it would endorse suspicionless
checkpoint stops in places other than the border if a checkpoint is
permanent and visible." The Court recommended as 65one possibility
to stop all oncoming traffic at "roadblock-type stops."'
A decade later, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,' 66
the Supreme Court directly considered the issue addressed only in dicta
in Prouse. In Sitz, the Court upheld a highway sobriety checkpoint
program in which all drivers were stopped and briefly examined for
signs of intoxication.'67 Each initial stop lasted approximately 25
seconds," but if the officer detected signs of intoxication, the driver
would undergo further sobriety tests outside the flow of traffic.' 69
During the checkpoint program in Sitz, which lasted for a total of one
hour and fifteen minutes, 126 cars passed through the checkpoint, 70
and two
drivers, or 1.5 percent, were arrested for alcohol impair1 71
ment.

Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658; see also United States v. Ramos, 733 F
Supp. 260, 263 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (finding that a roving, temporary checkpoint established by a
state narcotics officer was unconstitutional and stating that "[ilt is difficult to imagine a case of
more 'unconstrained exercise of discretion' than this one").
161. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657; see generally John M. Copacino, Suspicionless Criminal
Seizures After Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 215, 220 n.28
(observing that the Martinez-FuerteCourt defined objective intrusion as the "stop itself, the

questioning and the visual inspection" and subjective intrusion as "the generating of concern or
even fright on the part of lawful travellers [sic]").
162. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657.

163. Id. at 663.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).

167. Id. at 447.
168. Id. at 448.
169. Id. at 447.
170. Id. at 448. On the day before operation was to begin, a group of drivers brought suit
against the state of Michigan, "seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from potential subjection
to the checkpoints." Id. During pretrail proceedings, the state ceased the program pending the
outcome of the litigation. ld.
171. Id. at 454-55. The lawful border checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte discovered illegal
aliens in just 0.12% of the vehicles. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 554.
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After recognizing that checkpoint stops are seizures, the Sitz Court
asked whether Michigan's sobriety checkpoint was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment."7 In making this determination, the Court utilized
a balancing analysis that originated from Camara and Terry' and was
modified in Brown v. Texas. 74 Very similar to the Camara test, the
Brown test involves balancing the state's interest in the checkpoint, the
effectiveness of the checkpoint in furthering the state's interest, and the
level of intrusiveness caused by the checkpoint. 7 '
The Sitz Court noted that drunk drivers cause death and devastation
on the highways.'76 Therefore, the state interest in "eradicating" drunk
driving was especially significant.'" Consequently, the Court determined that a 1.5 percent detection rate was sufficient to continue the
checkpoints. 7 ' On the other side of the scale, the Court determined
that a 25-second inquiry of all motorists was brief in duration and
intensity.1 79 More important, the Court maintained, was that uniformed
officers stopped every vehicle at a visible, fixed location. 80 As a
result, "law-abiding motorists" would not be frightened or annoyed by
the intrusion. 8 ' The Court found it insignificant that many motorists
are unaware of their option to make U-turns to avoid the sobriety checkpoint." The Court concluded that the intrusion on motorists was slight

172. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
174. 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
175. See id. at 50-51. The Brown test involves "weighing of the gravity of the public
concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and
the severity of the interference with individual liberty." Id. The Sitz Court framed the Brown test
as "balancing the state's interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers, the
effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal, and the level of intrusion on an
individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints." Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448-49 (quoting Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 429 N.W.2d 180, 185 (1988) (citing Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51)).
176. Id. at 451. The Court noted that drunk driving annually causes one million personal
injuries, and at least five billion dollars in property damage. Id. (citing 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.8(d), at 689-90 (2d ed.
1987)); see also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432,439 (1957) (observing that "[t]he increasing
slaughter on our highways ... now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield").
177. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451.
178. Id. at 455. But see Slobogin, supra note 42, at 31 n.306 (contending that the success
rate in Sitz was too low to justify the seizure).
179. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-53.
180. Id. at 453.
181. Id. at 452.
182. Id.
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and indistinguishable from 83the intrusion involved in the border stop it
upheld in Martinez Fuerte.1
Despite the similarities between the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte
and Sitz, Sitz differed in one significant aspect. Unlike illegal aliens
targeted in Martinez-Fuerte,drunk drivers arrested in Sitz were subject
to criminal prosecution."4 Thus, Sitz is significant because it marked
the first time the Supreme Court approved a criminal seizure without
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing." 5 Both Martinez-Fuerte and
Sitz shared a non-criminal purpose. In Martinez-Fuerte,the purpose was
to reduce the flow of illegal aliens into the United States; 6 in Sitz, the
purpose was the safety of public highways.8 7 Nevertheless, in upholding a checkpoint with criminal penalties, the Sitz Court provided an
impetus for checkpoints designed to discover evidence of illegal activity,
such as weapons and illegal drugs.'
B. Pretextual Checkpoints
While the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of
checkpoints aimed at enforcing criminal laws, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals recently considered the constitutionality of checkpoints
aimed at detecting illegal drugs.8 9 In Merrett v. Moore,'9' the state
had devised a checkpoint for the principal purpose of checking for
illegal drugs.' 9 ' The state accomplished this by setting up a checkpoint
in which each driver was required to present a driver's license to a
uniformed officer." During the license check, another officer engaged
a drug dog to sniff the stopped car."93 During the two-day operation,

183. Id. at 453.
184. See Copacino, supra note 161, at 217-18 nn.10-11 (discussing both criminal and noncriminal aspects of Sitz).
185. Id. at 217.
186. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 552.
187. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-53.
188. See Copacino, supra note 161, at 217-18 (stating that "[a] definitive statement on the
scope of suspicionless seizures remains for a future case").
189. Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1548 (11th Cir. 1995). The Florida Department of
Law Enforcement (FDLE) established checkpoints designed to detect illegal drugs. Id. FDLE
envisioned designated checkpoints where each car would be exposed to drug sniffing dogs. Id.
at 1549. Because FDLE lacked the independent authority to operate roadblocks, it joined its
efforts with those of the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) to set up driver's license checkpoints in
tandem with drug sniffing dogs. Id. The plan was called the "Interdiction of Illegal Narcotics,
North Florida." Id.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 1550.

192. Id. at 1549.
193. Id. If the dog alerted to the presence of drugs or if the driver of the car had license
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1450 cars were sniffed by dogs, the dogs alerted police to 28 vehicles,
and one person, after a full search, was arrested on drug charges.' 94
Despite the .07 percent drug offender detection rate at the checkpoint, 95 the Merrett court upheld the state's scheme."9 The court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the checkpoint was an invalid
pretextual seizure because the state's purpose was to expose cars to drug
sniffing dogs."9 The court ruled that where the state has a lawful
purpose to justify a roadblock, even if that lawful purpose is a pretext
to search for illegal drugs, the checkpoint is legal.'98

or registration problems, the car was directed out of the flow of traffic. Id. "In the case of a dog
alert, a second dog [would sniff] the outside of the car." Id. If traffic became congested, vehicles
were waved through. Id. The checkpoint's operation resumed after there was a normal flow of
traffic. Id.
194. Id. The court recognized that an alert by a narcotics trained dog establishes probable
cause to believe a car contains' illegal drugs. Id at 1551 n.7 (citing United States v. DovaliAvila, 895 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1990)). Once probable cause exists to search a vehicle, no warrant
need be obtained prior to the search. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
195. See id. at 1549 (observing that one of 1450 sniffs resulted in an arrest).
196. Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1553. It is worth noting that a court challenge to a pretextual
checkpoint such as the checkpoint in Merrett is not unprecedented in Florida. See Cardwell v.
State, 482 So. 2d 512,513 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The Cardwell court upheld a checkpoint which,
like the one operated in Merrett, required drivers to provide a driver's license while a drug dog
was directed around the car. Id. at 513. In Cardwell, 554 vehicles passed through the roadblock
and only one person was arrested. I& at 514. The court stated that "[tihe devastating financial
and human waste occasioned by the use of drugs in this state and others, like the death and
mayhem caused by the drunk driver, is no longer open to question. The cooperation of Florida's
citizens ... is a small price to pay to combat this menace." Id. at 515; see also United States
v. Holloman, 908 F. Supp. 917, 921-23 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (upholding a speed trap with the use
of drug sniffing dogs while drivers are stopped and issued a citation).
197. Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1550-51.
198. Id. at 1550-51, 1553. Commentators and other courts probably will disagree with the
Merrettruling. See McFayden v. United States, 865 F.2d 1306, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (observing
that "[i]t is possible that a roadblock purportedly established to check licenses could be located
and conducted in such a way as to indicate that its principalpurpose was the detection of crimes
unrelated to licensing"); Webb v. State, 739 S.W.2d 802, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (holding
unconstitutional a roadblock that pretextually checked for drivers' licenses and registrations in
order to conduct general law enforcement searches); Clancy, supra note 31, at 625-26 (criticizing
the possibility that certain police practices will go unchecked). One commentator has noted
Drug trafficking is an enormous problem. Suspicionless seizures of travelers is a
tempting possible solution ... Roadblocks on highways could disrupt trafficking.
The traveler could be momentarily detained while a trained dog sniffed the
traveler... If a positive reaction resulted, then the police would have probable
cause to search and arrest. In cities, large and small, there are neighborhoods that
are characterized by a high incidence of drug trafficking. Brief stops of everyone
in such zones to learn the person's identification and perform a dog sniff would be
a fruitful investigative tool.
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The Merrett court analyzed the checkpoint as having a dual purpose
even though the state admitted it would not have conducted the
checkpoint but for its desire to subject motorists to drug sniffing
dogs.' The court noted that a checkpoint for drivers' licenses and
registration is lawful.2" Hence, the issue was whether the additional
search using drug sniffing dogs was legal.2"' The court recognized that,
under Place, a canine sniff of a person's luggage was not a Fourth
Amendment search.2" Similarly, the court noted that the use of a
canine to sniff the exterior of a vehicle is likewise not a search.0 3 In
addition, the court recognized that because the dogs sniffed the vehicles
during the driver's license and registration check, the drug portion of the
search added no extra time to the detention.2
The Merrett court next addressed whether the actual checkpoint was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 5 The court determined that
to the extent the checkpoint was conducted to ensure compliance with
traffic laws, it advanced an important state interest. 206 The court
observed that the document inspection and external canine sniff lasted
less than one minute.' Thus, the court found that, like the sobriety
checkpoint in Sitz, the intrusion on motorists at the checkpoint was
slight.08 Without referring to the state's interest in intercepting illegal
drugs, the Merrett court concluded that the balance of the state's interest

Clancy, supra note 31, at 625-26. But see Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659 & n.18 (noting that the
general interest in crime control is insufficient to justify suspicionless stops); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (stating that "lilt would be intolerable and unreasonable if
a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and
thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such
a search"); State v. Canton, 775 S.W.2d 352 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (disapproving a checkpoint
to check for driver's licenses, vehicle defects, intoxicated drivers and illegal drugs and weapons
in plain view because there was inadequate warning to oncoming traffic).
199. Merrett, 58 .3d at 1551.

200. Id. at 1550.
201. Id. at 1551.
202. Id. at 1553 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 706-09).
203. Id. at 1553 & n. 11 (stating that a sniff of vehicle's exterior not a search) (citing United
States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rodriquez-Morales, 929
F.2d 780, 788 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Morales-Zamnora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir.

1990)).
204.
205.
206.
case. See

Id. at 1553.
Id. at 1551.
Id. The fact that 61 vehicle related citations were issued probably helped the state's
id.

207. Id. at 1551 n.6.
208. Id. at 1551.
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in enforcing its licensing and registration requirements outweighed the
slight intrusion on motorists."
C. Are Pretextual Checkpoints Constitutional?
In essence, the Merrett court held that so long as there is a lawful
checkpoint, a state's improper motive will not invalidate it.21 In so
doing, the Merrett court permitted a checkpoint that was designed for
discovering criminal evidence.
The Supreme Court, however, has legalized only a limited set of
checkpoints, none of which were designed primarily to detect criminal
activity.2" ' Nevertheless, a Supreme Court case decided last term

209. Id. Several Florida state courts have fashioned similar rules with respect to canines
employed at traffic stops by police. See McNeil v. State, 656 So. 2d 1320, 1321 (Fla. 5th DCA
1995) (holding that it is lawful for an officer at a traffic stop to summon a K-9 unit with no
founded suspicion as long as the dog arrives before the officer has finished writing the ticket);
State v. Bass, 609 So. 2d 151, 152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (holding that it is lawful to use a dog
to'sniff a car stopped for a traffic violation if the dog arrives while a traffic ticket is being
written); State v. Taswell, 560 So. 2d 257, 257-58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (holding that it is lawful
for an officer to have dog sniff the exterior of a car stopped for a traffic violation if the dog is
aboard the officer's patrol car).
210. Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551. The Merrett court also addressed whether motorists were
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment while waiting in line before reaching the
checkpoint. Id. at 1552. The court noted that the officers were instructed to wave cars through
the checkpoint to avoid congestion. Id. But, the record revealed that the officers did not always
respond quickly enough to delays and during rush hour, and, as a result, some people waited up
to 45 minutes before reaching the checkpoint or being waved through. Id. The court determined
that the seizure issue depended on whether drivers reasonably believed they were not free to turn
around. Id. "The clock for assessing the reasonableness of the delay begins to run when a
reasonable person would believe that he cannot leave the line and avoid the checkpoint." Il
(citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)).
Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the Merrett court concluded that drivers
reasonably believed they could leave the line. See id. The record revealed that of the 2100
vehicles that were stopped or waved through the roadblock, only two drivers attempted to leave.
Id. at 1552 n.10. One of these drivers was only allowed to leave after being stopped and
questioned the other, after being told to wait in line, was only permitted to leave after his car
overheated. Il The court also thought it important that the physical terrain was amenable to a
U-turn since the highway medians were flat and dry. Id. at 1553 n.10. However, there were no
viable alternative routes and an officer in a "chase" car was positioned to stop any motorist
attempting to leave. Id. at 1552 n.10. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that motorists knew that
they could turn around and "expedite their confrontation" with the officer in the chase car. Id.
The court also rejected plaintiff's contention that a reasonable person would not believe he
was free to leave for fear he could be prosecuted under § 316.1935 of the Florida Statutes. Id.
That statute makes it a crime for a person to evade or elude a police officer after having been
ordered to stop. Il The court found that the statute does not apply to a person in the line of
traffic not yet at the roadblock. Id.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 149-88.
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suggests that a pretextual checkpoint may be constitutional. In Whren v.
United States,212 the Supreme Court held that so long as an officer is
allowed to make a lawful traffic stop, the officer's improper motive will
not invalidate it.213 The only difference between the holdings in
Merrett and Whren is that the officer in Whren had probable cause to
stop the motorist for a traffic violation. 24 The probable cause requirement for traffic stops limits the discretion of police officers in making
stops. 2 5 However, the probable cause requirement does not substantially limit police discretion in the context since any traffic violation,
no
26
stop.
valid
a
supports
enforced,
seldom
or
minor
matter how
Arguably, Whren authorizes the following police activity: (1) the
officer sees a driver whom he wants to stop to search for illegal drugs,
perhaps on the basis of general appearance or race; 27 (2) the officer
follows the driver and awaits a violation of a traffic law, such as driving
six inches over the line or falling to signal a lane change for the
required three seconds;2 8 and (3) the officer then makes a valid stop
for the traffic offense at which point the officer may use a drug dog to

212. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
213. Id. at 1774-76. In Whren, plain clothes narcotics officers patrolling a "high drug area"
stopped two black youths in a dark Pathfinder for a moving violation and subsequently seized
drugs identified in plain view. Id. at 1772. Defendant Whren argued that the police used the
traffic stop as a mere pretext to investigate for drugs for which the police had no articulable
suspicion. l, at 1775. The Whren Court held that mere pretext does not invalidate an otherwise
lawful stop. Id. at 1773.
214. See id. at 1772-73; Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1553.
215. See Brief for Petitioner at 17, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No.
95-5841), availablein Westlaw, 1996 WL 75758 [hereinafter Whren Brief].
216. Id. at 20 (arguing that "[w]ith traffic laws this subjective and nitpicking at police
disposal, the probable cause standard alone is ineffective to limit police discretion").
217. This may not be an uncommon occurrence. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 864
F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988) (observing that "[t]he classic example [of a pretextual stop],
presented in this case, occurs when an officer stops a driver for a minor traffic violation in order
to investigate a hunch that the driver is engaged in illegal drug activity"); State v. Arroyo, 796
P.2d 684, 688 n.3 (Utah 1990) (noting that state trooper admitted that "[a]s a result of training
at a seminar,... whenever he observed an Hispanic individual driving a vehicle he wanted to
stop the vehicle" and that "once he stopped an Hispanic driver, 80% of the time he requested
permission to search the vehicle"); United States v. Harvey, 16 F3d 109, 113 (6th Cir. 1993)
(Keith, J., dissenting) (pointing out that officer testified that he stopped the defendant's car
because "there were three black male occupants in an old vehicle"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 258
(1994).
218. See id. at 19 (maintaining that "at any given moment, surely thousands of drivers in
Utah are signaling for only two seconds, rather than the required three, before changing lanes"
(citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-9)).
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sniff the car for drugs219 or another method to search for drugs and
weapons.2 "
The reason checkpoints do not require any individualized suspicion
is that they are replete with other safeguards to prevent police discretion.
The most important safeguard inherent in checkpoints is that all vehicles
are stopped at a fixed, visible location, and each and every motorist is
subjected to the same brief, initial investigation.22' As such, checkpoints do not infuse individual officers with discretion. Hence, unlike in
individual traffic stops, no selective targeting occurs.222
In addition, checkpoints must serve a state interest.' So far, the
Court has approved checkpoints to verify driver's licenses and registrations,224 and to detect illegal aliens near the border,2' and drunk
the vital state interest in reducing the flow of drugs
drivers.226 Because
is undeniable,227 the use of drug dogs at checkpoints may likely be ap219. See United States v. Smith, 799 E2d 704, 706 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding the
following activity: the officer desired to stop a particular individual, he followed the car until
it weaved slightly, he stopped the car, and then he used a drug dog to sniff for drugs).
220. Whren Brief, supra note 215, at 23-29 (reviewing several cases in which searches were
performed following a pretextual stop). Even without the canine, the officer has a number of
methods at his disposal to search the car for drugs. One way to search the car is with the
consent of the owner. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); see also Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1983) (holding that an officer may conduct an armspan search
of the car's occupants upon reasonable suspicion of weapons); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S.
640, 648 (1983) (holding that an officer may conduct a full inventory search of arrested persons
to be incarcerated); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (holding that for traffic
offenses for which the officer is permitted to arrest the driver, the officer may conduct a search
incident to arrest, excluding containers in the trunk); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
380 (1976) (holding that an officer may conduct a search of the entire vehicle at the station in
taking inventory of a car); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972) (holding that an officer
may frisk the vehicle's occupants upon reasonable suspicion of danger); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 169 (1947) (holding that an officer may seize contraband or weapons in plain
view); United States v. Pierre, 958 E2d 1304, 1308-09 (5th Cir. 1992) (questioning the
reasonable expectations of vehicle occupants); United States v. Martinez-Miramontes, 494 F2d
808, 810 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that an officer may seize contraband by a plain smell search).
221. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; see also supra text accompanying notes 163-65.
222. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 140-44.
224. Prouse,440 U.S. at 660-61.
225. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 545.
226. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449.
227. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)
(identifying illegal drugs as "one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our
population"); United States v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (recognizing
a "veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics"); State
v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695, 701 (N.D. 1991) (maintaining that drug trafficking is "a societal
harm at least equal in magnitude to drunk driving"); but see Hagwood, 628 So. 2d at 1060
(finding that the government interest in preventing criminal activity was not as weighty an
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proved to the extent that checkpoints are effective in furthering such an
interest.
D. Can Checkpoints Be Dedicated Solely to
Detecting CriminalEvidence?
Merrett left open the question of whether a checkpoint conducted
solely to detect criminal evidence, such as a checkpoint in which
officers engage canines to sniff all vehicles passing through but do not
check licenses, is permissible. Whren and existing Supreme Court
checkpoint cases logically support this type of checkpoint. A court's
disallowance of criminal evidence checkpoints would require the state
to set up at least one acceptable purpose, even if the state would not set
up the checkpoint but for its desire to search for evidence of crime.
Such a rule would make little sense.
Checkpoints designed solely for the detection of criminal evidence
are not far off. A federal district court recently examined a checkpoint
designed to "eliminate driveby shootings [and] reduce drug trafficking."" In Maxwell v. City of New York,229 the New York Police
Department (NYPD) set up a checkpoint outside a high-crime area in
the Bronx.' The NYPD stopped all motorists entering the area and
asked for drivers' licenses to verify that they lived in the neighborhood.231 Any motorist who could not prove that he or she lived in the
area was turned away.1 2 However, the officers had discretion to let in
motorists that did not look like drive-by shooters. 3 The court struck
down the particular checkpoint as unconstitutional but did not conclude
that such checkpoints are unconstitutional per se under the Fourth
Amendment." Rather, the court engaged in a balancing analysis and
demanded evidence from the state that the checkpoint was effective in
reducing drive-by shootings and drug sales.235
Other recent efforts by states to combat crime have succeeded.
Several cities in California issue injunctions to gang members prohibiting them from engaging in otherwise legal activity such as carrying
beepers, portable phones, or mechanics tools, or riding bicycles.236
interest as enforcing immigration laws or eradicating drunk driving).
228. Maxwell v. City of New York, 1995 WL 244501, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
229. Id.
230. Id. at *2.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at *5.
235. Id.
236. Abigail Goldman, Wilson Pledges Funds to Fight Gangs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1996,
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While these injunctions are plainly not checkpoints, they have the same
purpose, which is deterrence of criminal activity. In addition, injunctions
and checkpoints are similar in that they both restrain normal activity in
response to pervasive crime. Thus, to the extent that checkpoint stops
with imaging devices are better at reducing crime than gang injunctions,
they may not be far off. 7
In order for a checkpoint to meet with constitutional approval, courts
must balance the state interest in the checkpoint, the checkpoint's
effectiveness, and the individual intrusion. 8 The Merrett court
avoided this balancing analysis with respect to the drug portion of the
checkpoint; it viewed the drug portion as adding no more intrusion to
the drivers' license checks. 39 A checkpoint solely for criminal evidence would force a court to conduct a balancing analysis since there
would be no other purpose of the checkpoint for the state to hide
behind. Since the balancing test will be relevant with respect to the use
of imaging devices at checkpoints, it is discussed in the next section.
E. Can Imaging Devices Be Employed at Pretextual
Checkpoints or Checkpoints Designed Solely
for Detecting Evidence of Crime?
The preceding analysis leads to the question of whether imaging
devices may be employed at checkpoints instituted solely to discover
weapons or contraband. The answer to this question depends on the
outcome of the balancing analysis discussed in the previous section.
States wishing to establish such checkpoints would have to first show
a state interest." ° The Supreme Court announced in Sitz that preventing drunk driving is a substantial state interest. 241 Like the drunk
driving concern in Sitz, there is a national interest in reducing crime
across the country; 242 hence, the first part of the balancing test likely
would be met. The state also would have to show that the checkpoint is

at B3 (noting injunctions in several cases which "ban identified gan members from participating
in certain activities within an identified zone"); Richard Lee Colvin, Judge Issues Sweeping
Injunction Against Gang, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at BI (stating that the court order prohibits
gang members from engaging in many legal acts).
237. See supra note 15; see also Millimetrix, Presentation, supra note 4 (noting that "[l]aw
enforcement applications [for the hand-held model] include use by police in situations where a
concealed weapon poses a danger to other civilians or to the police themselves, for example,....
where a gang is active, or when stopping a suspicious car").
238. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51; see also supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
239. See Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1553; see also supra notes 202-06.
240. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51; see also supra text accompanying note 175.
241. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451; see also supra text accompanying note 177.
242. See supra note 227.
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effective in furthering the state interest.243 In Sitz, the Court held that
a 1.5% detection rate was sufficient.2' Hence, if a state could show
that the use of imaging devices at checkpoints reduces criminal activity
in the surrounding area, this part of the test could also be met.
The difficult part of the test for a state to pass is the level of
individual intrusion. In Prouse, the Court found that the random stops
were too intrusive and suggested that the state conduct them in the
fixed, visible checkpoint format.245 The checkpoint approved in
Merrett employed the use of canines.' Currently, the canine is the
method of choice for detecting illegal drugs.247 A drug dog's sense of
smell is so acute that it can detect even the slightest trace of illicit
narcotics.24 In fact, most United States currency contains sufficient
quantities of cocaine to alert a canine.249 Canines therefore implicate
many innocent persons, and, as a result, these people must undergo a
more thorough search." For example, the canines in Merrett alerted
to 28 persons, only one of which actually possessed illegal narcotics.25
Thus, because the canine nose is so sensitive, the use of drug sniffing
dogs can be quite intrusive.

243.
244.
245.
246.

See supra text accompanying note 175.
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 188.
See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; see also supra text accompanying notes 163-65.
See Merrett, 58 F3d at 1549; see also supra text accompanying note 193.
247. See JEREMY TRAVIS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN ACTION, Mar.
1995, at 7 ("We learned that basically any dog could find explosives or drugs, even very small
dogs like Chihuahuas whose size could be an advantage.").
248. See State v. Juarez-Godinez, 900 P.2d 1044, 1056 n.4 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that
"a dog's sense of smell can be eight times stronger than a human's, and enables dogs to smell
odors... as far as 75 feet" away).
249. See I LAFAVE, supra note 114, § 2.2(f), at 450 n.239 ("It has been estimated that most
of the cash in circulation (the estimates range from 70% to 97% of all bills) contains sufficient
quantities of cocaine to alert a trained dog. Thus it sometimes happens in practice that a drug
dog alert will lead to nothing but currency." (citations omitted)); see also Mark Curriden, Courts
Reject Drug-Tainted Evidence, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1993, at 22 (discussing courts willingness to
overturn drug possession convictions based upon trace amounts of cocaine on U.S. currency).
Apparently, the latest estimate is that cocaine is on 70% of all U.S. currency. Currriden, supra,
at 22. Hence, when canines make mistakes in their alerts, they are likely doing what they are
trained to do: sniffing out narcotics. Id.
250. See, e.g., Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (involving a dog
that reacted to a 13-year-old female school student, who after a nude strip search, informed
school officials that she had played with her dog earlier that morning).
251. See Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1349; see also supra text accompanying note 194.
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Drug sniffing dogs are also physically intrusive. 52 Dogs are not
machines, hence, they may act erratically when their nose perceives
marijuana or cocaine. In Merrett, the dogs scratched several cars, and
one person was bitten by a dog.253 Even if the dog does not scratch or
bite, a canine sniff still may be intrusive. According to one commentator, "the very act of being subjected to a sniff by a German Shepherd
may be offensive at best or harrowing at worst to the innocent
sniffee."'' 4
With respect to illegal drugs, imaging devices may not be much
better than canines at reducing the number of false alerts. Currently,
imaging devices penetrate surfaces to produce outlines of items without
disclosing their contents.255 While this design will allow them to
expose contraband, they are chiefly designed for the detection of
concealed guns, the shapes of which are unmistakable. 6 Because
officers must evaluate the images and discern which objects are illegal,
they could easily make mistakes in their guesswork.257 For example,
a vile of prescription medication could easily be mistaken for a vile of
illicit narcotics.25 In addition, since it is up to the officers to evaluate
252. See Boyce, 723 F2d at 29; see also supra note 50. However, not all drug sniffing dogs
may be intrusive. See TRAVIS, supra note 247, at 7 (noting that "[a]lIthough German Shepherds
were favorites of the police, Chihuahuas were considered capable canine agents and could
perform their investigations more inconspicuously than larger dogs").
253. Merrett, 58 E3d at 1549. The Merrett court did not reveal why the dogs engaged in
this behavior. See id.
254. See Loewy, supra note 42, at 1426. Not all drug-sniffing dogs are German Shepherds.
See supra note 252.
255. See supra note 4.
256. MILLITECH, supra note 5.
257. See MILLrrECH, supra note 5 ("Dry powders and/or liquids in plastic bags, vials, or
other containers can be detected in centimeter or larger-sized packages. Detected powders could
be drugs or could be sugar. Passive millimeter wave imagers can detect the presence of solids,
powders, and liquids, but cannot determine their chemical composition.").
258. See id.Even in cases in which officers have guessed correctly that an item on the
defendant contains illegal drugs, courts have rejected the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 622
So. 2d 791, 794-95 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the seizure of cocaine found inside a
matchbox during a valid Terry frisk for weapons); Campbell v. State, 864 S.W.2d 223,224 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the seizure of cocaine from a film canister found in defendant's front
pocket).
In cases in which the officer testifies that the officer was unsure of what the item was,
courts have almost uniformly excluded the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Ponce, 8 F.3d
989, 999 (5th Cir. 1993) (testifying that an item felt like a little bump and that further feeling
revealed something squishy); United States v. Winter, 826 R Supp. 33, 36-37 (D.Mass. 1993)
(testifying that he was not sure what the bulge was); State v. Jimenez, 866 P.2d 667, 670 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1994) (testifying only that he felt a slippery material but did not know it to be drugs).
But see State v. Gonzalez, 1994 WL 449445, at *1, *2, *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1994)
(admitting crack cocaine into evidence even though there was black tape wrapped around the
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the images, the officers could "fabricate" illegal items in order to
conduct more thorough searches. 9 For example, the officer could
claim to see a gun to permit a manual frisk of the subject, something the
officer otherwise would not be able to do absent a reasonable suspicion
of danger." ° Imaging devices present the concern that they expose
personal items to public view. Hence, at least with respect to illegal
drugs, imaging devices also probably will not produce the requisite
suspicion to conduct a more thorough search.
Imaging devices will be most useful at checkpoints designed to
reduce violent crime by taking illegal guns off the streets.26' Canines,
of course, cannot detect guns. Hand-held metal detectors also are limited
because they cannot distinguish between car keys and a gun.262 As a
result, a metal detector would alert nearly every time it was used on a
person. If a device were developed that could detect only the presence
of metal the size of a gun, courts would be hard pressed to find that its
use is a search.26
Checkpoints have inherent safeguards against police discretion that
could permit the use of investigative techniques that would be disallowed in other settings.2" For example, the Merrett court, 6s as well
as a number of state courts, approved canine sniffs of vehicles at checkpoints without individualized suspicion.26 In contrast, no court has
permitted police use of canines to sniff persons at random. Thus, courts
may uphold the use of imaging devices at checkpoints even if they
disapprove of their use in random scans on the street.
At checkpoints in which police use imaging devices to scan all
motorists, safeguards could be implemented to reduce the level of
intrusiveness. All vehicles could be stopped at a fixed, visible location
and subjected to the same scan with an imaging device. The driver
could remain seated during the detention unless the officer sees a
weapon or contraband in which case the driver could be directed out of
vial and the officer could not know of the vial's contents until he opened it).
259. See United States v. Mitchell, 832 F. Supp. 1073, 1078-79 (N.D. Miss. 1993)
(excluding crack cocaine from evidence where officer testified that crack was immediately
apparent but the judge did not believe the testimony); Thomas v. State, 644 So. 2d 597, 598
(Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (excluding cocaine from evidence where the officer testfified "that the
object in [the defendant's] pocket felt like cocaine" because such testimony was conclusory).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
261. See supra note 5 (discussing the capability of imaging devices to detect dangerous
weapons).
262. See supra note 133.
263. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 221-22.
265. Merreit, 58 F.3d at 1553.
266. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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the flow of traffic. The officer might have to do a few scans to cover
locations in the car in which a weapon may be concealed, such as on
the driver, in the glove compartment, in the trunk, or under the
seats.267 Additionally, the lesser expectation of privacy associated with
automobiles2" might permit the use of imaging devices at checkpoints
where it would be unlawful in other settings.
Despite these safeguards, the rule for a criminal evidence checkpoint
should be no different than that with respect to a stop and frisk. Imaging
devices should be used at checkpoints only with reasonable suspicion
that the motorist is armed and dangerous.2 69 This may limit the
potential application of imaging devices in this setting. However,
officers who have the requisite suspicion could remotely frisk suspects
without physically touching them, thereby increasing officer safety.27
Katz continues to stand for the proposition that items which persons
seek to preserve as private, even in public (such as in an automobile),
should be constitutionally protected.2"' While contraband-specific
detectors such as dogs reveal limited information, the information
exposed is greatly increased with imaging devices.272 Thus, while there
is no legitimate expectation of privacy in criminal activity, there is a
legitimate privacy expectation in personal items hidden from public

267. Imaging devices can see through many materials, not just clothes. See supra note 123;
see also Millimetrix, Presentation, supra note 4 ("Further scans of suspicious areas will result
in an enhancement of the quality of the resulting image in that area.").
268. See supra note 156.
269. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also supra text accompanying notes 96-104. It is worth
noting that there is a potential conflict between imaging devices, detection of weapons, and
concealed weapons laws. With 42 states authorizing concealed weapons permits and 28 states
with non-restrictive right to carry statutes, there are millions of people who can carry a weapon
on their person legally. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (1994). However, I would argue that the number of states
allowing concealed weapons is not a large obstacle. Since concealed weapons holders often are
required to keep their permits on their person, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.06(1) (1995), it would
not seem unreasonable to briefly detain legal weapon carriers and require them to produce their
permits. The pervasively regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement supports my
contention. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972) (upholding inspections
of pawn shops for unlicensed firearms). In fact, while there are many weapons legally concealed
on the street, the same number of people may be carrying loaded handguns illegally concealed
in their purses and pockets. Lynn Van Matre, Concealed-Weapons Bill May Be Reintroduced,
Illinois LegislatorPoints to Study that it Helps Reduce Crime, PEORIA JOURNAL STAR, Aug. 9,
1996, at A12. But see Harris, supra note 3, at 56-60 (arguing that states permitting concealed
weapons pose a large barrier to the use of imaging devices).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 105-09.
271. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
272. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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view.273 Hence, while criminal evidence checkpoints may join the
select list of checkpoints to gain the Court's approval, it does not follow
that privacy safeguards should evaporate.
V. CONCLUSION

Checkpoint stops to detect criminal activity may soon gain the
Court's approval. Will imaging devices be needed at these checkpoints?
Perhaps not yet. But it is unfortunate that it takes events such as the
crash of Pan Am Flight 103274 and the Oklahoma City bombing275 to
make us realize that better detection devices are needed in our airports
and governmental buildings. As crime becomes increasingly pervasive,
imaging devices may be applauded by even the most stringent supporters of the Fot~rth Amendment. We as citizens may willingly give up
individual freedoms we once took for granted, such as the ability to
walk into a school without being searched or the freedom of walking
past a police officer on the street without sensing that he is looking
under our shirts.276

273. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
274. See Gleick, supra note 134.
275. See Twisted Fragments Offer Clues, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 30, 1995, at 20A.
276. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 6 (1949) ("It was even conceivable that they [the
Thought Police] watched everybody all the time.... You had to live--did live, from habit that
became instinct-in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in
darkness, every movement scrutinized.").
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